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The Language of Race 
Meira Levinson 
(Review of Lawrence Blum, “I’m Not a Racist, But…”: The Moral Quandary of Race (Ithaca; 
Cornell University Press, 2002).  Theory and Research in Education 1(3), pp. 267-281.) 
 
  Lawrence Blum’s book, “I’m Not a Racist, But…”: The Moral Quandary of Race, is 
excellent and thought-provoking.  It is a model of moral philosophy done well, and, as 
importantly, done with a purpose.  At no point does one wonder, as one does with all too much 
moral philosophy these days, “Why does this matter?”  Blum makes it clear from the start why 
we should care about the language and concepts of race and racism, and he does a brilliant job of 
integrating careful philosophical analysis with contemporary examples, historical explication, 
and creative thought experiments. 
  Blum’s purpose is basically two-fold: first, to fight against racism and racial injustice by 
proving that the notion of “race” is both descriptively false and morally inimical and replacing it 
with the more accurate and useful notion of “racialized group”; and second, to enable and 
promote productive dialogue about racism and racial inequality, especially between members of 
different racialized groups.  He is explicit only about the second of these aims — as he 
comments in the preface and reiterates in similar terms throughout the book, “If we agree that 
racism is so important, don’t we need to know what it is?  How can we talk intelligently, 
especially across racial lines, unless we do?” (p. viii) — but the first aim clearly determines the 
structure and content especially of the second half of the book.  In both cases, Blum suggests that 
language is a key: we can both move forward in the fight against racial injustice and promote 
cross-racial dialogue about racism and other racial ills, he suggests, if we analyze and clarify 
what we mean by certain words that are often used too loosely (such as “racist” and “racial   2 
discrimination”); recapture other terms that have inappropriately been divested of moral weight 
(such as “racial insensitivity” and “prejudice”); and abandon the language of “race” altogether 
because its history of use has made it inherently misleading.  This is the primary thrust of the 
book. 
  In this essay, I will question Blum’s emphasis on language and naming.  I will suggest 
that disagreements about the racial language we use, such as about “what racism is,” are integral 
elements of the debate about race and racial injustice, rather than something that can and should 
be resolved ahead of time.  Although Blum characterizes his analysis of racial language as being 
merely clarificatory, therefore, and designed to advance cross-racial dialogue from the outside, 
as it were, I will argue that instead he is doing something far different.  At best, he is staking a 
partisan position within the debate itself; at worst, he is cutting it off from the start by building 
the answers to most of the important questions about racism and racial discrimination into his 
definitions.  In addition to these methodological concerns, I also will query the practical results 
of implementing the linguistic shifts Blum proposes.  I will argue, first, that implementation of  
“racialized group”-talk will be harder than Blum suggests (even among people who fully accept 
his arguments and are willing and even eager to abandon “race” in favor of “racialized group”), 
and second, that it is unlikely to have the social psychological effects Blum predicts.  In both of 
these cases, I will consider teachers’ practices in implementing anti-racist curricula as an 
important test case, since teachers (along with parents and the media) play a crucial role in 
shaping the racial language and attitudes of the next generation.
i  Before I tackle these issues, 
however, a brief summary of (and a couple of quibbles with) “I’m Not a Racist, But…” are in 
order.   3 
  Blum establishes the moral and conceptual grounding for his project in his first and 
longest chapter, “‘Racism’: Its Core Meaning.”  In this chapter, Blum provides a deft historical, 
moral, and conceptual analysis of “racist” and “racism.”  He is concerned to construct a 
definition that preserves the strong moral opprobrium that attaches to “racism” while avoiding 
the “conceptual inflation,” “moral overload,” and “categorical drift” that have come to 
characterize the terms “racism” and “racist” — i.e., the indiscriminate application of these terms 
to a wide variety of categories (such as motives, beliefs, acts, and people) encompassing any and 
all “racial ills” from bigotry to prejudice to racial discomfort, as well as even to non-racial ills 
such as discrimination based on age, religion, nationality, or physical appearance.  By contrast, 
Blum limits the application of “racism” to things stemming specifically from antipathy and/or an 
inferiorizing attitude toward a racial group.  He shows why antipathy and inferiorizing are both 
sufficient and necessary to his definition — for example, one may feel benevolent toward blacks 
in part because one feels superior to them, but feel antipathetic toward Asians because one 
assumes they are smarter than oneself; both attitudes would be properly classified as racist, and 
he argues persuasively that all other examples of racism could fit into one or both of these broad 
categories.  Hence, Blum shows, although racism can be attributed to motives, acts, people, 
symbols, beliefs, images, epithets, remarks, attitudes, individuals, societies, and institutions (all 
categories that Blum discusses in detail), each attribution must be independently justified; one 
cannot just assume that a person who displays a racist symbol, for example, is a racist herself, or 
even that she necessarily has racist motives.  In this respect, Blum is sensitive to the mitigating 
(although still morally suspect) issues of individual ignorance, unreflective adoption of social 
norms and behaviors, and unconscious attitudes, any of which may cause an individual to appear 
but not to be racist, or alternatively to be racist in fact, but to have adopted these racist attitudes   4 
subconsciously or even unconsciously.
ii  Finally, in this chapter Blum gives significant attention 
not just to racism’s definition but also to its particular moral character.  He argues that racism is 
morally evil not just because it violates “general moral norms” such as equality, respect, and 
good will, but also because of its “integral tie” to historical “race-based systems of oppression” 
that were clearly evil.  “‘Racism’ draws its moral valence from this historical context in two 
ways.  First, the mere fact that these historical systems were based on race provides some of that 
opprobrium, even if current instances of racism no longer take place in the direct context of, for 
example, segregation, apartheid, or slavery. . . . [S]econd . . . we continue to live with the legacy 
of those systems” (Blum 2002: 27-8). 
  In chapter 2, Blum asks “Can Blacks Be Racist?” and answers in the affirmative.  No 
matter what preconditions one places on racism (e.g. that it must be ideologically embedded, or 
combined with social power), Blum argues, there will be (and are) some black people (as well as 
members of other minority groups) who meet these criteria and hence must be judged to be 
racist.  Insofar as the denial that blacks can be racist is motivated by a desire to highlight the 
inherent inequalities among different racist acts and beliefs, however, Blum would agree — and 
argues that — there are important “moral asymmetries” in racism.  Because of such acts’ 
“historical resonance” (p. 44), “greater power to shame” due to minorities’ positional inferiority 
(p. 46), reflection of on-going patterns and prevalence of racism (p. 48), and contribution to 
maintaining “systematic racial injustice” (p. 49), “Everything else being equal, greater moral 
opprobrium rightly attaches to racism by whites against people of color than the reverse.  This is 
the most important moral asymmetry in racism” (pp. 43-4). 
  Chapter 3 catalogues “Varieties of Racial Ills,” which are acts or attitudes that deserve 
some (often substantial) degree of moral condemnation but do not rise to the level of “racism” as   5 
such.  These include racial insensitivity, racial ignorance, racial discomfort, white privilege, 
exclusionary same-race socializing, and racialism (a term used here to mean “conferring too 
much, or inappropriate, importance on people’s racial identity” (p. 59), but which Blum 
confusingly reuses with a different meaning in chapters 5-9).  Chapter 4 then moves into an 
extremely careful and thoughtful discussion of “Racial Discrimination and Color Blindness.”  He 
deduces four reasons that discrimination may be wrong: “(1) it unfairly excludes a qualified 
individual on the basis of a characteristic irrelevant to the task for which selection is being made; 
(2) it is done out of prejudice; (3) the prejudice is pervasive and (for that or other reasons) 
stigmatizing; (4) the discrimination helps to sustain the group whose members are discriminated 
against in a subordinate position” (p. 89).  Hence, he argues, the term “racial discrimination,” 
which automatically carries with it the implication of moral condemnation, should be confined 
“to forms of discrimination involving race that either stem from race-based prejudiced [sic] or 
that disadvantage an inferiorized or stigmatized group” (p. 95).  In contrast, he argues, forms of 
racial differentiation that avoid the four pitfalls listed above may be tolerated or even embraced: 
for example, racial egalitarianism, which does rely to some extent on racial differentiation but 
not on discrimination as defined above, is preferable to color blindness. 
  Chapters 5-7 form an undesignated second section of “I’m Not a Racist, But…”, focusing 
specifically on the concept, history, and science of “race” in order to debunk it.  Blum analyzes 
the empirical outcomes of thinking in racial terms in chapter 5, “‘Race’: What We Mean and 
What We Think We Mean.”  He identifies four moral dangers of racial thinking: (1) “a moral 
distance among those of different races — an intensified consciousness of a ‘we’ of one race 
counterposed to a ‘they’ of another” (p. 102); (2) the “imposition of false commonality on all 
those classified as members of the same race” (p. 103); (3) the suggestion of “an inescapable   6 
‘racial fate’” (p. 104); and (4) “associations of superiority and inferiority of value” (p. 104).  
These lead into chapter 6’s fascinating discussion of “‘Race’: A Brief History, with Moral 
Implications,” in which Blum shows the historical contingency and relatively recent vintage of 
racial thinking, at least in the West.  (Although Blum’s language about race’s recent arrival on 
the scene is fairly global, his examples are almost entirely confined to ancient Greece and Rome, 
Europe, and North America; this leaves the reader a bit confused about the intended scope of his 
historical analysis and claims.)  Finally, chapter 7 boldly asks, “Do Races Exist?” and marshals a 
fair amount of scientific evidence (in conjunction with the historical evidence from chapter 6) to 
answer a resounding “no.”  
  This outright rejection of race sets up the challenge he confronts in the final two chapters 
(and unstated third section) of the book: how simultaneously to rid ourselves of the inimical 
concept of “race” while still promoting the causes of racial justice and equality — causes which, 
as Blum showed in chapter 4, require for their achievement that we name and pay attention (as 
opposed to blind ourselves) to differences among racial groups.
iii  In chapter 8, “Racialized 
Groups and Social Constructions,” therefore, Blum proposes to replace the concept of “races” 
with “racialized groups,” arguing, “The term ‘racialized groups’ is preferable as a way of 
acknowledging that some groups have been created by being treated as if they were races, while 
also acknowledging that ‘race’ in its popular meaning is entirely false” (p. 160).  Blum further 
justifies use of the term “racialized groups” in chapter 9, “Should We Try to Give Up Race?”  He 
argues that racial justice and even a positive sense of racial identity can be promoted by 
“racialization”: “its recognition supplies a more accurate understanding of the character of the 
racialized social order, encourages a stronger recognition of commonalities of experience and of 
political and moral commitments across ‘racial’ lines, and, arguably, would in the long run be   7 
more politically effective in mitigating racism and racial injustice than would a belief in the 
reality of race” (p. 170).  But Blum recognizes that merely transforming our language is not 
enough; this act will not itself transform the unjust social structures that inform and shape our 
language: “In the real world, ridding ourselves of the myth of race can not be severed from the 
politically more challenging task of changing the structural relationships among racial groups” 
(p. 178).  Hence, he concludes by implicitly urging a two-pronged approach to promoting racial 
justice and equality: altering our language, on the one hand, and engaging in direct social action 
(especially integrationism), on the other. 
 
Critique 
  I find most of Blum’s arguments compelling taken on an individual basis.  “I’m Not a 
Racist, But…” convinces me that the term “racism” should be reserved for race-related, morally 
egregious beliefs/motives/acts/etc., that there’s a wide range of racial ills, that pursuit of racial 
equality does not amount to racial discrimination, that “race” is a morally inimical concept, and 
that “racialized group” better captures the historical genesis and conceptual construction we call 
“race.”  I am not convinced, however, that these arguments taken together satisfy the central 
articulated aim of the book: namely, to promote cross-racial dialogue about race.  This is not, as 
I’ve said, because I question his reasoning or his conclusions; rather, I question whether his 
method, of using substantive moral philosophy, is consonant with this aim. 
  First, some reminders about Blum’s stated aim.  As I noted at the beginning of this essay, 
Blum asks in the preface of “I’m Not a Racist, But…”, “If we agree that racism is so important, 
don’t we need to know what it is?  How can we talk intelligently, especially across racial lines, 
unless we do? . . . . We need to clarify what racism is, to find a basis in history and current use   8 
for fixing a definition” (p. viii).  He reiterates this concern at the beginning of chapter 2: “My 
goal of an adequate account of racism is entirely antithetical to race-based attachment to 
definitions of ‘racism.’  I am seeking an account that will facilitate communication between 
groups about the character, forms and extent of racism (and other race-related ills).  For that we 
need some agreement on what racism is, and from there we can attempt to settle differences 
about its extent” (p. 35).  Blum’s aim is clearly to establish a baseline for discussion — to foster 
productive communication by providing moral and conceptual clarification and then to get out of 
the way in order to allow the now “intelligent” and “facilitated” debate to proceed on its own. 
  This is an admirable goal, but I don’t think that “I’m Not a Racist, But…” achieves it — 
nor do I think that it could achieve it in its current form.  This is so for a few reasons.  First, it is 
misleading to suggest that moral philosophy is necessary to fix a definition of “racism.”  So long 
as there’s an agreement, or at least mutual comprehension among the interlocutors, as to what 
each person means in using various terms, then that is sufficient to promote dialogue.  For 
example, if all people accepted that only whites could be racist, then “cross-racial dialogue” 
could proceed on that basis; there’s no reason that Blum’s definition of racism (which asserts 
that all people can be racist) is necessary to promote dialogue. 
  Of course, one of Blum’s implicit points is that there isn’t agreement about what racism 
is, and that such agreement, or even mutual clarification and comprehension, is very unlikely to 
arise on its own.  Rather than revealing a troubling weakness or gap in the discussion, however, 
this reveal instead the essential nature of the debate about race and racism: namely, that debating 
the meaning of these terms is part and parcel of debating the things themselves.  In other words, 
fixing a definition is not a neutral act.  It is a partisan act.  This is because much of the dispute 
about racism is bound up in how one defines the problem.  If individuals unintentionally benefit   9 
from the legacy of racism (e.g. via “white privilege”), are they morally responsible in some way?  
Is it racially discriminatory for an association serving mostly Latino youth to try to hire mostly 
Latino staff?  Is it racist for a small business owner to hire people she “feels comfortable” with, 
if it turns out she tends to feel comfortable only with people from her own racialized group, since 
that’s among whom she grew up?  These questions lie at the heart of the “conversation about 
race”; they cannot and should not be settled ahead of time.  Thus, Blum’s second methodological 
mistake is to think that setting a neutral baseline for discussion is even possible.  Blum’s 
approach is inevitably partisan — simply in trying to clarify meanings, he takes stances on a 
number of controversial issues — and hence he is within rather than above the fray.  This is 
perfectly appropriate — taking and defending particular stances about how we ought to live our 
lives is what moral philosophy is, or at least should be, about — but it is not what Blum 
professes to be doing.  Furthermore, Blum’s approach is at least partly opposed to his stated aim 
of promoting cross-racial dialogue about race and racism, insofar as to the extent that readers 
accept Blum’s positions as given, their avenues for debate about race and racism will be cut off 
rather than expanded.  I hope (and expect) instead that readers will be drawn to engage with and 
debate the arguments themselves, as any good work of social and moral philosophy should 
inspire people to do; they do not, however, provide a neutral starting point for others’ 
conversations.
 iv 
  My concerns about the match between Blum’s stated objective and the content of his 
book are irrelevant to my assessment of his arguments or his conclusions, most of which I think 
are generally on target.  I do wonder, however, about the concrete, “on the ground” implications 
of his conclusions, especially but not solely for those responsible for educating the next 
generation.  I will address two especially pressing questions: (1) How would one use the   10 
language of “racialized groups” in a way that was clearly distinct from using the language of 
race, especially in institutional contexts?  (2) Is there convincing psychological evidence to 
support Blum’s claims about the results of redescribing social and identity groups?  For example, 
is there convincing evidence that thinking of oneself as being a member of a socially constructed 
racialized group has more positive psychological effects than thinking of oneself as a member of 
a biologically-determined race?  These questions raise issues that are significant for assessing the 
practical import of Blum’s arguments in general; they are also crucial for determining how his 
conclusions would alter anti-racist curricula and pedagogy in the classroom,  which presumably 
will be central to the realization of Blum’s moral philosophy. 
  First, Blum’s claim that we can combat racism (at least to some extent) by altering our 
language about race has moral purchase only if there is some way to “operationalize” — and 
especially to institutionalize — this linguistic adjustment.  Blum seems to acknowledge this, and 
to be optimistic about its potential:  “Appreciating the difference between race and racialization, 
and at the same time attempting to do justice to the unreality of race and the reality of racism, 
may point us toward new ways of thinking and new forms of institutional practice” (p. 166).  He 
gives one (and only one) example of how one might adopt “new forms of institutional practice” 
in relation to the Census, which is a key tool for tracking racial patterns and disparities in society 
— but also hence for seeming to legitimate racial categorization.  In response to this dilemma, 
Blum suggests, “Were the federal government to encourage a broad understanding that the 
purposes for which the Census is now explicitly used do not require a commitment to the 
existence of races in any form, but only to racialized groups, the legitimate discrimination-
monitoring function of Census racial categories could be severed from any implication of 
racialism” (p. 167).  But then frustratingly, Blum gives no specifics about how the Census could   11 
do this.  Would Blum hope for a statement of disavowal of race?  If so, where?  Just in the 
preamble (which already includes a “baby step” in that direction (see p. 227, fn. 11)), which 
nobody reads?  Or in the census itself, which seems impractical since it is intentionally kept as 
short as possible in order to maximize response rates? 
  Instead of a statement of disavowal, the Census could replace “What is this person’s 
race?” (the question currently asked) with “What is this person’s racialized group?”, and then use 
quotation marks (or “scare quotes”) around terms such as “black,” “Spanish/Latino/Hispanic” 
(which is currently kept separate from the “race” question), and “white” to reinforce their 
constructed status.  This is also unsatisfactory, however, for two reasons.  First, “racialized 
group” will likely be either greeted with confusion or treated as a synonym of “race,” especially 
in the absence of an explanation of the term; in the latter case, it is likely to end up acquiring the 
separatist, hierarchical, and essentialist connotations or “race” (just like “disabled” and even 
“differently abled” acquired those of the maligned term “handicapped” they were designed to 
replace).  Second, many of the choices given are not (yet) “racialized groups,” at least not in the 
United States, but are nationalities: Samoan, Filipino, Native Hawaiian, Asian Indian, Japanese.  
Should these terms all be in scare quotes?  I would think not — but then how would one deal 
with the presence of scare quotes some places and their absence others?  One could add 
“nationality and/or ethnicity” to the “racialized group” question, and then surround everything 
with quotation marks — but this then gets cumbersome, to say the least, and is likely to raise 
other dilemmas. 
  As the Census example shows, institutionalizing “racialized group” language is hard in 
print, particularly when it comes to naming and labeling the racialized groups themselves 
(“black,” “white,” “Vietnamese,” “Native American”).  It is substantially harder in conversation,   12 
such as in the oral give-and-take of a classroom.  Consider Ellen, a teacher of ten and eleven 
year-olds, who is eager to incorporate anti-racist education into her teaching.  Ellen reads “I’m 
Not a Racist, But…” over the winter holiday and then sits down to revise her January lesson 
plans, which include a unit on non-violent protest designed both to fit into the school’s conflict 
resolution initiative and to lead up to the celebration of Martin Luther King, Jr.’s birthday.  As 
she reads over her plans, she quickly inserts a mini-lesson on “racialized group” at the beginning 
of the unit and converts “race” to “racialized group” throughout the unit.  She adds in a two-day 
lesson called “What is Racism?”, and develops an interactive group activity for near the end of 
the unit designed to help students decide when it’s okay to refer to or take someone’s racialized 
group membership into account and when it’s not.  Reviewing her social studies lessons on 
Ghandi, Martin Luther King, Jr., and the March on Washington, D.C., she is pleased.  She also 
thinks her English lesson on an excerpt of King’s Letter from Birmingham Jail will prove 
challenging but inspiring to her students.  But then Ellen suddenly gets worried.  Throughout her 
lessons are references to blacks, whites, Indians, British, Hindus, Christians, Jews.  Which of 
these are racialized groups and which are not?  How can she help her students figure out the 
difference?  How can she talk about “blacks” and “whites” to her class without her students 
falling back into racial thinking?  She can hand-signal scare quotes each time, but will that just 
turn into a joke among the students?  And which groups would she use the hand signals for? 
  All of these concerns are predicated on the conclusion that language matters — that it 
influences how we think, reason, behave, and interact with one another.  This brings us to my 
second question about implications of Blum’s conclusions: is there social psychological evidence 
in favor of them?  Throughout the book, Blum clearly operates on the assumption that if people 
recognize the socially constructed, rather than biologically inherent, nature of racialized groups,   13 
then they will better be able to fight against the “hierarchical” and “inegalitarian” (p. 107) 
assumptions inherent in racial thinking.  This is partly because racial identity then becomes in 
some way a matter of choice.  “Whether a group is racialized is a matter of its treatment by the 
larger society.  Whether the group takes on a self-identity as a race is a different matter” (p. 148).  
In recognizing their racialized treatment, rather than believing themselves defined by an 
immutable racial identity, individuals who are members of racialized groups can decide how to 
respond.  Will they embrace their racialized identity, as those do who proudly join the Asian-
American club, volunteer with La Raza, or wear t-shirts proclaiming “It’s a BLACK thing — 
you wouldn’t understand” or “Hot Latina Mama”?  Will they reject it, declaring “that’s not who I 
am” and/or trying to assimilate?  Or will they try to subvert it in some way, say by reclaiming the 
term “nigger” (or “queer” in the [non-racial] case of gays) and defiantly using it as a term of 
affection for others inside the group?  By choosing the extent and nature of their racial identities, 
Blum seems implicitly to be arguing, individuals and groups are empowered; whether they 
choose to appropriate, reject, or subvert the characterizations thrust upon them by racializing 
others, the very act of choosing liberates them from the racialist (and racist) assumptions of 
innate difference, inferiority, and/or stigma. 
  Two substantial bodies of work in social psychology, however, cast serious doubt on this 
claim.  The first is system justification theory — the theory that “psychological processes 
contribut[e] to the preservation of existing social arrangements even at the expense of personal 
and group interest” (Jost and Banaji 1994: 1).  The second is the notion of “stereotype threat” — 
the idea that in certain situations (those posing “stereotype threat”), members of stigmatized 
groups worry about confirming a negative stereotype about their group through their 
performance on a task, and then, precisely because of this anxiety, end up performing worse on   14 
the task than they otherwise would (and than others do) — thus paradoxically performing true to 
negative stereotype (see Steele and Aronson 1995; Steele 1997).  I will address each in turn. 
  According to system justification theory, people implicitly support the status quo, 
including hierarchy differences between low- and high-status groups, even when they are 
members of low-status groups, and even when they reject the distinctions on a conscious level.  
Thus, in studies done under both “authentic” and experimental conditions, women ask for lower 
wages than men do for the same work (or they work 25 percent longer than men if offered the 
same wage (Cite forthcoming)); individuals rate even initially unwanted outcomes (such as 
tuition increases, or a member of the opposing political party winning an election) more 
desirable the more likely they are to occur (Kay et al. 2002); and they rationalize the legitimacy 
of existing inequalities (e.g., if told that graduates of University B earn more on average than 
University A graduates, University A students will rate University B students as being smarter 
and better writers than they; if told the opposite, however, then University A students will 
express the opposite prejudice and rate themselves higher (cite forthcoming)).  Even individuals 
who explicitly articulate egalitarian beliefs tend to demonstrate moderate to strong implicit 
attitudinal biases toward higher-status groups (whites, young people, men); this is true regardless 
of the individual’s own group membership(s) (Greenwald and Banaji 1995; Banaji 2001).  In 
other words, individuals internalize prejudice, discrimination, racism, and/or oppression (Jost 
and Banaji 1994; Jost et al. 2002; Kay et al. 2002).  “[M]embers of disadvantaged groups 
internalize negative stereotypes and evaluations of their own group, to at least some degree” 
(Jost et. al. 2002: 598).  Thus, even if people know that they are members of a group that is 
treated (merely) as if “there were inherent and immutable differences between them; as if certain 
somatic characteristics marked the presence of significant characteristics of mind, emotion, and   15 
character; and as if some were of greater worth than others” (Blum 2002: 147), they are still 
likely to believe, subconsciously at least, that these are accurate assessments of their group 
membership. 
  It takes a great deal of inner strength to stand up to stigma, discrimination, and prejudice.  
Even those who consciously reject racialist presumptions may respond differently 
subconsciously.  This may be because of internalized oppression, as discussed above.  But it may 
also be a result of rational adjustments in motivation or expectations.  Knowing that one “is 
discriminated against, stigmatized, or inherits a history of racial” disadvantage (p. 177) may very 
well (and rationally) lead one to adopt a presumption of disadvantage — a belief that one’s effort 
will not be rewarded because of on-going discrimination and racism, and hence a reduction in 
effort, motivation, and/or aspirations.  There is clear evidence of both effort reduction (Stone 
2002) and aspiration reduction even among people who consciously reject stereotypes, such as 
women who profess a liking for mathematics (Nosek et al. 2002).  This lowering of expectations 
is clearly compounded if individuals accept, whether implicitly or explicitly, the idea that they 
really are inferior in some way (as system justification theory suggests). 
  Furthermore, as Claude Steele’s acclaimed work on “stereotype threat” shows, there are 
significant psychological and performative costs even simply in knowing that one is a member of 
a group that is perceived in a negative light.  For example, research over the past few years has 
consistently shown that black students do worse on verbal tests if told the test is a measure of 
ability than they do if they are told the test is non-diagnostic (Steele 1997); the same is true for 
women’s performance on math tests (Keller 2002).  Similarly, white students do worse than 
controls on tests of athletic skills if told that the their performance will indicate their “natural 
athletic ability,” but black students do worse if told their performance indicates their “sports   16 
intelligence” (Stone, et. al. 1999).  This response to “stereotype threat” is evident even among 
very young children (ages six to ten): children above seven years old demonstrate high levels of 
stereotype consciousness (awareness of others’ stereotypes about various groups), and children 
who are members of stigmatized groups perform worse when they think they are being measured 
along stereotypic lines than they do on the exact same test when their stereotype awareness (and 
hence sense of stereotype threat) is not activated (McKown 2002). 
  These results pose a serious challenge, I believe, to Blum’s claims about the practical 
import of his moral philosophy.  Although it is true that this research has all been done under 
conditions of “race” rather than “racialized groups” being salient (insofar as “racialized groups” 
has not become a popular or widespread term), it strikes me as being highly unlikely that this 
internalization of stigmatization and/or inferiorization would change even if “racialized groups” 
were widely adopted and “race” widely discredited.  Insofar as system justification theory is 
correct, individuals seem likely to internalize, live up (or down) to, and even implicitly endorse 
and perpetuate race-based hierarchies whether or not they recognize that “race” is a falsehood 
and “racialized groups” are social constructions.  And insofar as “stereotype threat” is a real, 
observable phenomenon, its pernicious depression of stigmatized group members’ performance 
seems likely only to increase, if anything, if individuals learn to think about their group 
membership as being entirely a product of racism, prejudice, and discrimination.  
  These issues, again, pose special challenges for educators.  One of the key objectives of 
anti-racist education (and of “diversity” or “multicultural” education, which are the more 
euphemistic terms favored in the United States) is to help students develop respect for members 
of all racialized groups.  This obviously is intended to reduce racist attitudes and behaviors on 
the part of all students; it also has the intended effect of promoting self-respect among members   17 
of historically stigmatized or inferiorized groups both by teaching them grounds for respect for 
their own group and by showing that other people, including their peers, express respect for their 
group.  Blum clearly would support this objective and both of its outcomes.  How would it be 
realized, however, in a school that took Blum’s moral philosophy to heart?  I ask because 
currently, many curricula promote respect for racialized groups at least in part by teaching about 
the achievements of people within each group.  Thus, teachers try to combat inferiorization of 
and promote respect about and among African-Americans by teaching about Garrett Morgan, 
Lewis Lattimer, Harriet Tubman, Arthur Ashe, Matthew Henson, Phyllis Wheatley, Maya 
Angelou, Ralph Bunche, Crispus Attucks, James Meredith, etc.  This approach makes sense, 
however, only if one believes in some kind of inherent connection between them and 
contemporary African-Americans.  They are all members of the same racialized group — but 
that’s just to say that they all run (or ran) the risk of being targets of racism.  Without a racial 
connection — without some assumption of a biological or other inherent connection — it is 
frankly illogical to think that the impressive achievements of some members of a racialized 
group have anything to do with, let alone should promote respect for, other members of that 
group. 
  This litany of achievements may, and should, demonstrate that members of the racialized 
group should not be presumed to be inferior, which itself is an important blow against racism.  
And it may be that this is enough; it may be sufficient for anti-racist education to combat 
assumptions of antipathy and inferiority, rather than also to promote respect.  I imagine, 
however, that Blum would prefer not to take this position.  There are good reasons to preserve 
respect as an important component of anti-racist or multicultural education, not the least of 
which is that the promotion of self-respect is a key tool for reducing the detrimental   18 
psychological responses (such as hierarchical system justification and vulnerability to stereotype 
threat) discussed above. 
  “Minority” children’s self-concept may additionally be threatened by the elimination of 
“race.”  If one thinks of “blacks” as a race who have been wrongly looked down upon, then it is 
possible to declare instead, “blacks are beautiful” — to rewrite the history and character of the 
race in a positive, celebratory light.  If one recognizes that “blacks” as a group are a result of 
racialization, on the other hand, and hence exist only in light of a history of mistreatment, 
discrimination, prejudice, and oppression, then it takes essentially a willfully bizarre reading of 
history to put a positive (or even neutral) spin on one’s identity as a black person.  Although 
Blum claims that “a black consciousness can be based not on race but on racialized identity” (p. 
169), the arguments he gives show why racialized identities will lead to less social division in 
society and to a reduction in the moral ills derived from a belief in “race” — good outcomes, 
certainly, but not ones that do anything to show that “racialization” can sustain black pride.
  I do not mean these comments to suggest that I am eager to reinstate “race” into the 
moral equation.  “Race” introduces its own set of tremendous problems and pathologies into 
anti-racist curricula.  Also, as I said above, I am generally convinced by Blum that “race” is an 
empirically nonsensical and morally detrimental notion, and that “racialized group” is much 
better.  But I would suggest that much more work needs to be done to flesh out the practical 
implications of Blum’s moral philosophy, especially if Blum would like to see his theories put to 
use in the education of the next generation.  “I’m Not a Racist, But…” does an excellent job of 
balancing thoughtful historical analysis, attention to the moral and emotional resonance of 
language, empirical examples, and distinctions with a difference.  I hope that in his future work, 
Blum takes the time to explore the implementation and institutionalization of his ideas in much   19 
greater detail, as it would be unfortunate if the influence of Blum’s work ends up being confined 
to the written word.   20 
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i  I focus on teachers rather than parents or the media both in deference to this journal’s focus on 
education, and because of these three groups, only teachers have a curriculum that is relatively 
transparent and subject to public regulation. 
ii On this point, I would urge Blum (and interested readers) to read the fascinating and 
provocative work on “implicit prejudice” being done by psychologist Mahzarin Banaji and her 
colleagues.  Banaji has shown through literally millions of tests (conducted on her website and 
one run by the Southern Poverty Law Center) that even self-consciously egalitarian and anti-
racist individuals tend to harbor implicit prejudices against typical out-groups such as blacks, 
Asians, and gays.  See Banaji 2001 and Banaji and Bhaskar 2000 as well as 
http://implicit.harvard.edu and http://www.tolerance.org/hidden_bias/index.html. 
iii I recommend Pollock 2004 for a fascinating and comprehensive complementary analysis of the 
dangers both of “race-talk” and of being “colormute.” 
iv In this spirit of engaging with Blum’s substantive claims, I would also briefly challenge the 
strength of his argument that “racist” can apply to a member of any racialized group, not just 
whites.  As I noted in my summary above, Blum emphasizes the capacity for all members of 
racial groups to hold and act upon inferiorizing and/or antipathetic attitudes toward other racial 
groups, and hence to be racist.  He acknowledges the special harm done by white racists against 
non-whites by developing the concept of “moral asymmetries” in racism.  One could consistently 
argue, however, that racism is inseparable from the “moral asymmetries” entailed in the 
identities of the perpetrator and victim.  Limiting “racist” to whites is a different approach to 
fighting against the conceptual inflation (i.e., the indiscriminate attachment of “racist” to a host 
of racial ills) that Blum decries in chapter 1 by limiting it to what Blum himself admits is the 
worst racial ill: racism by a white person against a member of a historically stigmatized or 
subordinate group.  The same form of argument could privilege institutional and social racism 
over personal racism, again by building asymmetries into the definition. 